One year ago, San Antonio’s chances of landing Homeland
Security’s $500-million golden goose of germ research
— the National
Bio- & Agro-Defense Facility — were good.
Three of the eighteen sites being considered were in Alamo City.
Just up the road, Texas A&M was dropped after embarrassing
and potentially dangerous lab mishaps. An escaped baboon
running for dear life from the heavily primatized Southwest Foundation
probably didn’t increase SFBR’s rating with the
Feds, either. Homeland is considering a variety of factors in the site
selection process, including public support, access to existing
infrastructure, ability to attract qualified researchers, and security.
When the shortlist was announced last summer, the odds on San Antonio
remained statistically the same at one-in-six, but a strongly
supportive and/or silent public played to the boosters’
advantage. Tens of millions of dollars have been spent by the research
community to bring N-BAF to San Antonio.
However, since the U.S. General Accounting Office required Der Homeland
to quantify the risk of outbreak from the center tasked with studying
some of the most deadly diseases known, it has become apparent that
expanding the existing home for zoonotic diseases, those that can be
passed from human to animal and back again, may be the best option
after all. (GAO
doubts research lab can be moved safely.)
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center off the tip of Long Island was
not under consideration when Homeland first began the site selection
process but was added along the way as protests in various communities
took root.
Plum Island was originally sited where it is in the 1950s to keep risky
research into foot-and-mouth disease off of the U.S. mainland. However,
since the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. has seen a surge in bio-defense
research across the country (and a lack of oversight and a rash of
security breaches) that has made siting a new facility closer to
current research centers more desirable.
Consider that in 46 states there are now 1,356 BSL-3 labs monitored by
the CDC and 15 BSL-4 labs. The total number of BSL-3 labs (those
outside CDC range) is unknown.
Since 2003, there have been more than 100 accidents and cases of
missing deadly germ shipments.
A GAO investigation found no single agency is tracking the bio-safety
labs and oversight is “fragmented,” relying heavily
on self-reporting.
In its Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Homeland officials report
that a Rift
Valley Fever Working Group determined that an RVF outbreak
under worst-case scenario would not be identified until day 27,
“by which time the number of infected animals and humans have
tripled.” Such an event would cost the U.S. economy more than
$50 billion and untold lives. The cost of a foot-and-mouth outbreak
would also run into the billions.
Of course, outbreaks cost the same whether they are intentionally or
accidentally triggered.
So it would seem that barring any major problems with the Plum site,
security would rule the day and the island would keep on playing host
for this most sensative of research. The
Draft Environmental Impact Statement repeatedly
references the benefit of the island location.
•
“Plum Island’s relative isolation from the
surrounding environment, including its distance to livestock areas of
any consequence and its prevailing seaward winds, would render that
location a lower risk to the regional and national agricultural economy
than the mainland sites …
• “The Plum Island
site is near the New York City metropolitan area, but its location on
an island reduces the likelihood of viral transmission to
people or
animals …
• “The generally
colder climate of Plum
Island compared to the other alternative sites
could reduce the ability of mosquitoes … or their offspring
to survive and maintain the virus over time. Hence, from a
human health
economic perspective, Plum Island could pose a smaller threat compared
to the other alternative sites.
• “The other
alternative sites are relatively similar in economic health risks,
although establishment
of infected mosquitoes in one of the
southeastern sites could lead to a more rapid dispersal of the disease
to larger human populations such as in the Atlanta or San Antonio areas
and ultimately lead to a permanent reservoir of virus …
• “Of the proposed
location sites, only
Plum Island has no livestock populations in the
vicinity of the proposed site. The other five locations have livestock
population densities either between 10 and 20 livestock per kilometer
or between 20 and 30 livestock per kilometer …
• “From an
agricultural economic perspective, the mainland sites are not
significantly different from each other in terms of risk to the local
economy … Many
of the alternative sites are located
relatively close to human populations; for example, Athens
is only
about 60 miles from Atlanta, Georgia, which has a metropolitan
population exceeding 5 million people. Similarly, the Texas site is
located on the outskirts of the City of San Antonio, which in 2007 had
a population approaching 2.6 million.”
So, all things being equal, and the naturally enhanced security of
off-East-Coast research, why the push to bring the germ lab onshore?
Well, all things are not equal.
The Plum Island site would cost an estimated $250 million more than any
of the onshore alternatives. The $500-million project quickly becomes a
$750-million project when it meets island real estate.
Who’s game for a small wager that USHS gambles to save a
quarter-billion in short-term savings for the heightened risk of losing
multiple billions in lives and greenbacks down the road?
---
{UPDATE: Just found
this report to Congress that may shed some light on plans to sell the
existing Plum Island site to help pay for a less-safe site on the U.S.
mainland. USHS has had a hard time cobbling together the needed
hundreds of millions for N-BAF... Condo over former disease lab just
not that appealing.}
Selling Plum Island
One option raised by DHS has been to sell Plum Island and use the
profit from such a sale to offset the construction costs of the NBAF,
the decontamination and remediation costs for the island, and the
demolition costs for the PIADC. Under this proposal, DHS would sell
Plum Island in FY2009 or FY2010, arrange with the purchaser to allow
operations to continue until the NBAF construction was finished, and
transfer Plum Island to the purchaser only after clean up of the island
had been completed.71 Most sales of surplus property are handled by the
General Services Administration and any funds received redirected into
the Treasury.
The DHS has proposed to add statutory language to the FY2009 DHS
appropriations act providing express authority to liquidate the Plum
Island assets and retain the proceeds of the sale. The proposed
language indicates that these funds could be used to offset costs
associated with construction of the NBAF; however, the proposed
language would also allow the DHS Secretary to use the net proceeds of
the Plum Island sale for “other real property capital asset
needs.”73 Under this proposed language, the net proceeds from
the sale of Plum Island would be retained by DHS until fully spent
rather than reverting to the Treasury at a future date.
---
[You'll find the text of this
blog reduced and rearranged while the imagry is amped up for this
week's edition of Last Words.]